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Abstract
Often the justifications for the emergence of public regulation have been explained 
as instances of ‘market failure’. In such instances, it is always argued that somehow 
an unregulated market has failed to produce social outcomes in accordance with the 
public interest. Market failure theory is a classic economists’ view regarding the 
emergence and justification of regulation. Nevertheless, market failures are ubiquitous 
and so cannot be put forward as a theory to explain the emergence of regulation. 
However, one might like to think from a different perspective – from a legal point of 
view – that regulation actually emerges because of the subversion of justice, ineffi-
ciency or inadequacy of the common law. It is the failure of contract and tort law as 
a mechanism to secure property rights that has prompted the emergence of regulation. 
However, there is another view that regulation also emerges on the basis of ideas of 
fairness and rights.
A. Introduction
There is always a rational explanation or justification for the emergence of a new 
regulation, except in very exceptional circumstances where a government wants to 
regulate for some selfish or irrational motive, such as a means to win the next elec-
tion. Most of the justifications for regulation have been explained as instances of 
‘market failure’. In such instances, it is always argued that somehow an unregulated 
– in other words uncontrolled – market has failed to produce social outcomes in 
accordance with the public interest.1 Market failure theory is a classic economists’ 
view regarding the emergence and justification of regulation. Nevertheless, market 
failures are ubiquitous and so cannot be put forward as a theory to explain the emer-
gence of regulation. However, one might like to think from a different perspective 
– from a legal point of view – that regulation actually emerges because of the subver-
sion of justice, caused by inefficiency or inadequacy of the common law. The common 
1 J Francis, The Politics of Regulation, Ch. 1 (Oxford, 1993). For public interest justifications see 
generally: A Ogus (n 10) Ch. 3; S Breyer,(n 11) Ch. 1; T Prosser, Nationalised Industries and Pub-
lic Control: Legal, Constitutional and Political Issues (Oxford, 1986); C Hood, Explaining Economic 
 Policy Reversal (Buckingham, 1995); C Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regula-
tory State (Cambridge, MA, 1993); E Gellhorn and RJ Pierce, Regulated Industries, Ch. 2 (St Paul, MN, 
1982); J Kay and J Vickers, Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal, in G Majone (ed), (n 9); BM  Mitnick, 
(n 9). 
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law has proved to be vulnerable to the realities of human nature in the market place; 
it is the failure of contract and tort law as a mechanism to secure property rights that 
has prompted the emergence of regulation. There is another view that regulation also 
emerges on the basis of ideas of fairness and rights. Furthermore, for some, the emer-
gence of regulation is always for political reasons. It can therefore be seen that there 
are a number of rationales for the emergence of regulation. This study begins with 
the discussion of the notion of regulation and progresses along the discussions of the 
concept of ‘market failure’, theory of subversion of justice and ideas of rights and 
justice, and inadequacy of private law. In this vein as it discusses the justification for 
regulation in the positive sense, the main focus of the study is positive as to why 
regulation emerges; it thereby hypothesises that regulation emerges due to the subver-
sion of justice.
B. Notion of Regulation
One might say that regulation has existed as long as governments, as governments 
have often interfered in private matters.2 To make this discussion of regulation man-
ageable and meaningful, it focuses on the term in its modern sense. The term ‘regula-
tion’, as such, is not definable in a generic sense as a single concept. However, it 
becomes considerably easier to define when seen through the ‘taxonomy of regula-
tion’. Regulation may be broadly classified as public or private (self-regulation)3 
regulation, or legislative or non-legislative regulation. The former is the focus of this 
study. In a general discourse, prima facie regulation means public regulation; it is a 
term of art4 that has a widely accepted meaning under state law5, excluding common 
law. It would be futile and irrational to offer a single authoritative definition of the 
concept of regulation that holds across the public/private regulatory divide6 because 
the origins and normative foundations of the two are different. Public regulation is a 
binding legal norm created by state powers for the purpose of shaping the behaviour 
of persons both natural and legal.7 The state has a monopoly over the coercive power 
2 Expropriation and distribution of wealth by kings or dictators by fiat is not regarded as regulation 
and therefore does not form the part of the discussion.
3 See N Gunningham and P Grabosky, Smart Regulation (Oxford, 1997). The authors make a point 
for the role of regulation by corporations, professional and trade bodies, voluntary organisations and 
self-regulators along with state regulation, and indicate where state and private regulation can work 
more effectively.
4 Cf. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 112 S.Ct. 711, 116 L. Ed. 2d 731(1992).
5 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice, 2 
(Oxford, 2012); Baldwin, Scott and Hood, Regulation, Ch. 1.
6 J Jordana and D Levi-Faur, The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance, in The Politics 
of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (2005); WJ Novak, 
Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America 45 Hastings L.J. 1061, 1071 (1994).
7 See DP Baron, Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions, in R Schmalenee and 
RD  Willing, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Vol.2, 1349 (1989) (“Regulation involves gov-
ernment intervention in markets in response to some combination of normative objectives”).
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of law. It is created by a legislature or administrative or executive authority that has 
the legal power to create a binding legal norm.8 Whereas private regulation is unable 
to make itself into a legal norm, it does not have state power behind it. Private regu-
lation is created and enforced as a contractual arrangement, not by state direction, 
restriction, command and control or state influence. However, one philosophical argu-
ment that may hold for any type of regulation is that the idea of regulation is to guide 
all concerned participants away from an undesirable action and towards a desired 
one.9
The notion of public regulation has been defined in a number of ways.10 However, 
there seems to be a consensus among various authors that at the basic level it repre-
sents state intervention in private law. Ogus sees regulation as the ‘necessary exercise 
of collective power through government’.11 This connotes elastic or coefficient col-
lective power, incorporating command and control techniques as well as persuasive 
influence.12 Selznick view the concept of regulation as sustained and focussed control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community.13 Bald-
win and Cave see regulation as ‘deliberate state influence’ whereby it covers all state 
actions designed to influence industrial or social behaviour.14 This terminology 
explains the concept in its full scope. Deliberate state influence is the same as the 
necessary exercise of collective power through government. Selznick limits regula-
tion to secondary legislation, whereas Ogus and Baldwin and Cave include primary 
legislation within the definition of regulation. These views convey the central mean-
ing of regulation, whether be restrictive or facilitative15– state intervention in the 
sphere of private law, and an exercising of state control16 or influence. However, this 
8 B Orbach, What is Regulation? 30 Yale Journal on Regulation Online (2012).
9 A Beattie, The Pitfalls of Financial Regulation <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/econom
ics/10/pitfalls-financial-regulation.asp>.
10 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (n 4) at 3-4; Baldwin, Scott, Hood, Regulation, Ch. 1; A Ogus, 
Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, 1994); J Black, Decentring Regulation: Under-
standing the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post Regulatory” World 54 Current Legal 
Problems 103-47; J Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philoso-
phy 1-95 (2002); D K Smith, What is Regulation? 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy (2002); 
BM Mitnik, The Political Economy of Regulation, Ch. 1 (New York, 1980); G Majone (ed), De-Regu-
lation or Re-Regulation? (London, 1989). 
11 A Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford, 1994).
12 S Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, MA,1982); A Ogus (n 10), Ch. 1, 1; R Baldwin, 
Regulation: After Command and Control in K Hawkins (ed.), The Human Face of Law (Oxford, 1997).
13 P Selznick, Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation in R Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Science, 363 (Berkeley, C.A, 1985).
14 R Baldwin and M Cave (n 4), 4.
15 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, Cambridge, 2009); Ogus, Regula-
tion (n 9). 
16 Black’s Law Dictionary, 1311 (9th edn, 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary defines regulation as ‘the 
act or process of controlling by rule or restriction’. A similar definition of regulation as ‘to control, 
govern, or direct’ is found in The Oxford Dictionary. The main theme in the above efforts to define 
regulation is that it is an act of controlling behaviour.
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theme is rather comprehensively captured by the term ‘influence’ in Baldwin and 
Cave’s definition of regulation as ‘deliberate state influence’.
The apparent confusion about the nature of the term ‘regulation’ is largely due to 
the abstract concept it denotes.17 The confusion is compounded when the concept is 
explored in other disciplines such as politics, sociology and economics. In these con-
texts, regulation becomes a highly contested concept. It is seen by the political right 
as the tool of authoritarian government, and by the left as a structure to support the 
interests of the dominant class. Democrats see it as a public good18 which allows the 
control of myriad societal risks from welfare to ecology by distribution of wealth.19 
For economists, it amounts to an instrument of exploitation used by private interests.20 
However, this research focuses exclusively on regulation within the legal context.
The definition of regulation can also be determined by understanding the concep-
tual difference between law and regulation. Laws are normative in nature, based on 
societal norms and enforced by the judiciary. Private law (e.g. contract and tort) are 
based on legal norms interpreted and developed by the courts, and are thus a judge-
made or common law. The law is there to protect property rights and rights in general. 
It protects property from transgressors such as thieves and fraudsters, and defines the 
boundaries of property so that legitimate disputes can be settled through litigation, 
under contract and tort law. Thus, law is all about safeguarding rights.
Regulation, on the other hand, is not primarily about rights; it is about prescribing 
the behaviour of people, economic activities, and activities in general. It controls what 
one should or should not do, irrespective of one’s rights and irrespective of property. 
By definition, most regulations (not all) are preclusive in nature. They preclude indi-
viduals from acting in a certain way either to achieve the government’s desired out-
come or to avoid any undesirable consequences. Regulations are not there to protect 
rights, and indeed some have argued that by their very nature they are a violation of 
individual rights. They interfere with people’s ability to live freely and to deal with 
their property as they see fit. Regulations are written rules (legislation) as opposed to 
legal norms or principles of law found in court judgements. Regulation is mandatory 
in nature and must be followed by everyone whereas application of law can be agreed 
between the parties, under the principle of freedom of contract, and followed. So the 
regulation displays state power as opposed to law which is normative, showing that 
the origins of law and regulation are different. In this sense, all primary as well as 
17 Barak Orbach (n 7) at 3. 
18 See generally J Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge, 1989); Braithwaite, 
Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford, 2002); I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford, 1992). 
19 D Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance, Jerusalem Paper in Regulation and Gov-
ernance, Working Paper no.1 (February 2010). 
20 GJ Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, 2, 3-21 (1971); GA Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry 
21 Journal of Law and Economics 269-96 (1978); G Priest, The Origin of Utility Regulation and the 
“Theories of Regulation” Debate 36 Journal of Law and Economics 289-324 (1993).
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secondary legislation can be defined as regulation. From a legal perspective, a statute 
enacted by a legislature is understood to be a paradigmatic form of regulation.21
However, this strong argument could be countered by the argument that regulation 
actually reorganises private rights and obligations, and by doing so it prioritises rights 
and obligations and thus overrides private law by being a public law.
In essence, this means that any state-made law, as opposed to any general, tradi-
tional or normative law such as the common law, civil law or laws of other legal 
traditions such as the Chinese or Russian legal traditions, is a regulation. Thus it may 
be conceptualised that regulation is a state action in the form of a legal instrument 
made by a government or a public body that is designed to influence the behaviour 
of persons, either natural or legal, that is valued by the community.
C. Market Failure: An Economic Perspective
i. The Concept of ‘Market Failure’
The need for regulation arises when there is a market failure; this is the rationale most 
often presented for regulation.22 Market failure means “a circumstance where the 
pursuit of private interest does not lead to an efficient use of society’s resources or a 
fair distribution of society’s goods”.23 Put another way, it means when a particular 
market “fail[s] to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public 
interest”.24 It can also be described as a situation where the allocation of goods and 
services by a free market is not efficient.25 In simplest terms, it means the existence 
of an unfair market place, which prevents an efficient outcome. An efficient market 
makes a market participant better-off without making someone else worse-off.26
The concept of market failure originally developed in relation to the question of 
the proper role of the state in the market place; governments struggled to decide which 
services the state should provide or how it should regulate the activities of individu-
als and firms.27 In this regard, the concept of market failure provided itself as an 
21 B Morgan and K Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials, 4 (Cam-
bridge, 2007).
22 See R Baldwin and M Cave (n 4) at 16-22.
23 DL Weimer and AR Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practices, 13 (2nd edn, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, 1992); See also D MacRae and JA Wilde, Policy Analysis for Public Decisions, 170 (Lan-
ham, MD, 1985); EK Browning and JM Browning, Microeconomic Theory and Applications, 657 (4th 
edn, New York, 1992); Boardman et al., Cost-benefit Analysis: Concept and Practice, 99 (Upper Sad-
dle River, NJ, 1996). 
24 R Baldwin and M Cave (n 9), Ch. 1.
25 R Cooter, Normative Failures Theory of Law 82 Cornell Law Review 947, 945 (1996).
26 This outcome is contrary to Pareto optimality; where Pareto is of the view that no one can be 
better off without making some other individual worse off.
27 RO Zerbe Jr and HE McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure 18 Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 559.
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objective standard by which such decisions can be made.28 Originally, the concept of 
market failure was used only as a normative concept to define appropriate circum-
stances for government intervention in markets, meaning in economic terms, why the 
necessity for public intervention should arise.29 Later on, as the concept of market 
failure matured, it was also viewed as a diagnostic tool by which policy makers could 
understand how to objectively determine the exact scope and type of intervention.30 
Hence, Joseph Farrell alludes: ‘The welfare theorem lets [us] classify inefficiencies 
as due to monopoly externalities, and so on. This helps us to understand and perhaps 
to solve such inefficiencies just as a doctor’s diagnosis … is part of treatment’.31 The 
diagnostic approach consisted of a double market failure test to identify the types of 
problems that cause market failure, as well as the bureaucratic malfunctions and non-
market failures that are likely to occur.32 Thus the concept of market failure was used 
by public officials33 to determine the proper role of the state in a marketplace.34
ii. Instances of Market Failures
In a society there are many types of market failure in all walks of life, for example 
market failure occurs where monopolies exists because competition is deficient. 
Monopolies exist when one company produces for the entire market.35 There are no 
substitutes available to consumers and there are high barriers for new entrants to the 
market.36 In such conditions, the producer will restrict its output and increase prices 
above marginal cost to maximise profits. This consequently damages public interests, 
leaving the consumer worse off. Regulation can introduce competition in monopolised 
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. See also, CJ Dahlman, The Problems of Externality 22 (1) Journal of Law and Economics 
143 (1979); AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 173 (4th edn, London, 1932); P.A Samuelson, The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 36 Review of Economics and Statistics 388; NT Skaggs and JL Carl-
son, Microeconomics: Individual Choice and its Consequences, 543 (2nd edn, Cambridge, MA, 1996). 
30 RO Zerbe Jr and HE McCurdy (n 27); See also DL Weimer and AR Vining (n 23); Boardman 
et al. (n 23); DN Hyman, Public Finance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy (Chicago, 
1990); U Procarcia, Crafting A Corporate Code from Scratch 17 Cardoza Law Review 629-645; J Far-
rell, Information and the Coase Theorem 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 113-129. 
31 Ibid.
32 DL Weimer and AR Vining,(n 23), 179.
33 LD Alessi, Error and Bias in Benefit-Cost Analysis: HUD’s Case for the Wind Rule 16 Cato 
Journal 129 (1996).
34 DL Weimar and AR Vining (n 23), 13: “[W]hen is it legitimate for government to intervene in 
private affairs? In the United States, the normative answer to this question has usually been based on 
the concept of market failure – …”
35 Gellhorn and Pierce (n 21), 36-37; See generally, Ogus (n 10), 30-3; Breyer (n 11), 15-19; Foster 
C, Privatisation, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies, Ch. 6 (Oxford,1992); 
Francis, Politics of Regulation, Ch. 3; E Gellhorn and W Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics, chs 
3 and 4 (St Paul, Minn., 1994). 
36 See generally C Foster (n 35), Ch. 6; Gellhorn and Pierce (n 21), 36-37; R Baldwin and M Cave 
(n.4), 16-18; Ogus (n 10), 30-33; Breyer (n 11), 15-19; E Gellhorn and W Kovacic (n 35), chs 3 and 
4; Francis (n 21), Ch. 3. 
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markets. Except where natural monopolies exist37 and producers will serve consum-
ers at least cost,38 the common response to monopolies is to use competition law39 
(regulation) to create a fair market for competition.40
The other commonly cited examples of potential market failure include: exter-
nalities41 such as pollution and systemic risk in the banking industry and so need to 
be regulated because the price of a product does not reflect the true cost to society of 
producing that product;42 windfall profits that are not a result of planned investment;43 
and information inadequacies where markets are distorted and not enough informa-
tion is available to evaluate competing products. All those myriad instances where 
insufficient information might damage consumer interests necessitate some level of 
market regulation.44 Keynes pointed out factors45 such as imperfect information,46 
economies of scale, inequality of income, external economies, adjustment lags, and 
indivisibility of production as representing unfair markets.47 One may also add to this 
non-exhaustive list the other commonly cited examples of potential market failure 
including anti-competitive behaviour, predatory pricing, non-availability of services 
in remote areas,48 public goods, the moral hazard49 scenario (free riders), and unequal 
bargaining power.50
iii. Market Failures are Ubiquitous
Theoretically, the concept of market failure provides a rationale for unlimited govern-
ment intervention, meaning that state intervention is justified or it must intervene 
whenever there is a market failure. It appears to provide a normative explanation for 
state intervention, but in reality it is not a ‘normative’ concept as it describes a situ-
37 Competition is undesirable in such circumstances as it will introduce social costs and go against 
public interest; regulation of prices, quality, output level and access are preferable See Ogus (n 10) 
31; G Yarrow, Regulation and Competition in the Electricity Supply Industry in J Kay, C Mayer, and 
D Thompson (eds), Privatisation and Regulation (Oxford, 1986).
38 M Waterson, Regulation of the Firm and Natural Monopoly, Ch. 2 (Oxford, 1988); Foster, Pri-
vatisation (n 36), Ch. 6.2. 
39 In the case of ‘natural monopoly’, however, competition law is not desirable. On natural monopo-
lies, see M Waterson (n 38), Ch. 2; Foster (n 38).
40 See also, Ogus (n 10), 31; G Yarrow (37).
41 CJ Dahlman (n 29), 141, 143.
42 The rationale of regulation in this context is to reduce ‘overconception’ and protect the environ-
ment by forcing the polluter to pay the actual price. See Ogus (n 10), 35-8; Breyer (n 11), 23-6.
43 Breyer (n 11), 21.
44 F Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society 35 American Economic Review 519 (1945); Ogus, 
Regulation, 38-41; Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, 26-8.
45 FH Knight, Laissez-faire: Pro and Con 75 (6) Journal of Political Economy 782 (1967).
46 See F Hayek (44); Breyer (11), 26-8; Ogus (10), 38-41.
47 See generally JM Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire: The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
(first published 1926; BN Publishing, 2009). 
48 See generally Baldwin and Cave (n 4), 16-22.
49 G Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, 1970).
50 E.g., collective bargaining agreement.
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ation that is ubiquitous; market failures happen all the time and are everywhere. This 
will lead to ambiguous conclusions. Market failure, as a rationale for regulation, is 
only true in the case of significant failures. Empirical evidence also suggests that 
government intervention is only optimal when a significant market failure occurs.51 
The existence of an externality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for state 
intervention, and it cannot be assumed that government intervention is warranted in 
all cases of market failure.52 Market failure per se is not a precondition to interven-
tion. In terms of efficiency, regulation should only arise where the cost of regulation 
is less than the benefits. In this context, a cost benefit analysis should provide clear 
guidance. Thus, normatively and empirically, the concept of market failure is flawed. 
However, it is important to emphasise that significant failures do justify public inter-
vention, such as regulation.
iv. The Concept of ‘Transaction Costs’ and Property Rights; and Market Failures
Coase sees externalities through his so-called ‘Coase theorem’, where all rights are 
defined and parties can negotiate their rights and reach a conclusion through a bar-
gaining process. In this contractual process, he sees issues settled on the basis of 
transaction costs53, which obviate the need for the search of market failures and hence 
the need for regulation. In economics, a transaction cost is defined as the cost of par-
ticipating in a market place – in other words, a cost incurred in making an economic 
exchange. Broadly these costs are the resources necessary to transfer, establish and 
maintain property rights. Property rights are theoretical structures in economics for 
establishing how a resource (property) is owned and used.54 Property refers to owner-
ship, which entails rights to the proceeds generated by a property and control over a 
resource or good (property). Hence, property rights can be viewed as an attribute of 
an economic good (property); this attribute has four broad components and is often 
referred to as a bundle of rights, or rights inherent with the property. These four rights 
are (1) the right to use the good; (2) the right to earn income from the good; (3) the 
right to transfer the good to others; and (4) the right to enforcement of property rights.
Market failures (externalities) are actually transaction costs. If transaction costs 
are imposed through law (contract and tort) then externality will be zero, and therefore 
51 PA Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 45,159 (6th edn, New York: McGraw Hill 
1964); RH Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics 17 Journal of Law and Economics 357-376, 364, 366 
(1974); MA Zupan, Are Public Goods Good for the Public? Working Paper, University of Southern 
California Business School, Los Angeles, California (1996); A Randall, The Problem of Market Fail-
ure 23 Natural Resources Journal 131-148, 147; AG Pigou (n 29), 174; SNS Cheung, The Fable of the 
Bees: An Economic Investigation 16 Journal of Law and Economics 11-33, 16 (1973); SNS Cheung, 
The Theory of Share Tenancy, 56-61 (Chicago, 1969); HS Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common 
Property Resource: The Fishery 62 Journal of Political Economy 124-142.
52 U Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code From Scratch 17 Cardozo Law Review 629 (1995).
53 RH Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937). Reprinted in R Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the 
Law (Chicago, 1988). 
54 RH Coase, The Problem Of Social Cost 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-44 (1960).
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no market failure can occur. The non-enforcement of the transaction costs by law 
(tort, contract and criminal law) is actually a failure of law rather than the market. 
Ideally there should be no circumstances where an externality could be outside the 
scope of law or regulation unless there is a subversion of justice.
In reality, externalities exist because the transaction costs for resolving a dispute 
are too high. For example, environmental regulations are designed to overcome resis-
tant negotiators, where negotiations between developers and local communities resis-
tant to site facilities, such as landfill, can be characterised as contracting issues and 
can fail because of the high transaction costs insisted upon by the resistant negotiator. 
As a result, the bargaining will halt because of the high transaction cost.55 Such a 
dispute reveals the dynamics that foil bargaining processes, which requires regulation 
to be implemented.56 Transaction cost analysis is significant in the context of cost 
benefit analysis to achieve the optimum outcome in regulatory terms.
D. Theory of Subversion of Justice: One Theory of Regulation
i. Emergence of an Alternative Mechanism
A fundamental theoretical departure may be made from the economic argument for 
the emergence of regulation (market failure), to the legal argument (that regulation 
arises because of a subversion of justice, inefficiency or inadequacy of common law). 
It actually arises for reasons embedded in justice and fairness. ‘Regulation’ is essen-
tially a legal phenomenon and as a result it must have its explanation in legal juris-
prudence. ‘Market failure’ is essentially a concept which is entrenched in the discipline 
of economics, not law. The economic argument is therefore essentially an economist’s 
perception of regulation and has little to do with the analysis of the concept of regu-
lation as a legal phenomenon in its origins in social settings.
Private relationships between parties were primarily dealt with in accordance with 
the rules of private law, i.e. contract and tort law. Hence commercial disputes were 
generally resolved through private litigation. For example, in the US, a country which 
has been at the forefront of developing regulation, before the nineteenth century the 
courts decided upon cases of corporate liability in industrial accidents, on anti-com-
petitive practices, safety of foods and medicines and so on. However, over three 
decades, roughly from 1887 to 1917, this whole situation changed because of the so 
called ‘Progressive Era’, which introduced the landmark Interstate Commerce Act 
along with other kinds of regulation.57 Regulation emerged as an alternative mecha-
nism and the nineteenth-century belief that private litigation was the only appropriate 
55 BD Richman and C Boerner, A Transaction Cost Economizing Approach to Regulation: Under-
standing the NIMBY Problem and Improving Regulatory Responses 23 Yale Journal on Regulation 
29-76 (2006).
56 Ibid.
57 See generally R Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955).
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response to social wrongs was chipped away.58 Regulation was brought in as an alter-
native to civil law.59 During the progressive era, regulatory agencies took over the 
social control of food and drug safety, competition policy, rail road pricing and so 
on.
Although Britain has the earliest history of regulation, it has not been discussed 
extensively in a theoretical framework, such as the analysis of the subversion of jus-
tice and failure of common law or in an economic theoretical perspective. An area 
that would merit closer investigation would be the Regulation of Railways Act 1844, 
which dealt with pricing and safety issues and by doing so had overridden the com-
mon law principles of contract and tort law for the sake of efficiency, owing to its 
vulnerability to market place. Between 1844 and 1923, regulation emerged as a com-
prehensive regulatory regime which had developed to tighten railway safety and 
prices/rates.60 The 1844 Act actually shaped the US 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, 
which in turn shaped subsequent regulation in the US.61
The central issue is why this change happened or why contract or tort law could 
not successfully address the problems of the Progressive Era or eighteenth-century 
UK industrialisation of society.62 The answer to these questions lies in the discussion 
of the choice between litigation over damages and regulation in terms of efficiency.63
ii. Subversion of Justice
Subversion of justice occurs when law (in particular contract and tort law) fails to 
protect the functioning of markets efficiently. The purpose of private law is to facili-
tate private relations between private parties e.g. in contract law. However, such 
facilitation of private bargaining in a market may stumble upon difficulties.64 To deal 
with problems, new regulations are introduced.
58 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State XLI Journal of Economic Literature 
401 (June 2003). 
59 Expropriation and distribution of wealth by kings or dictators by fiat is not regarded as regulation, 
therefore does not form the part of the discussion. 
60 I McLean, The Origin and Strange History of Regulation In The UK: Three Case Studies in Search 
of Theory, Paper for ESF/SCSS Exploratory Workshop: The Politics of Regulation, Barcelona, Novem-
ber 2002, at 7, 4-17, at <http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2002/w29/The%20origin%20
and%20strange%20history%20of%20regulation%20in%20the%20UK.pdf>, accessed on 03/04/2015; 
on Victorian regulation, see generally G Alderman, The Railway Interest (Leicester, 1973); Foster, 
Privatization, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly (Oxford, 1992); TR Gorvish, 
Mark Huish and the London and North Western Railway (Leicester, 1972); WC Lubenow, The Politics 
of Government Growth: Early Victorian Attitudes towards State Intervention 1833-1848 (Newton Abbot, 
1971); H Parris, Government and the Railways in the 19th Century (London, 1965); PM Williams, 
Public Opinion and the Railway Rates Question in 1886’ 67 English Historical Review 37-73 (1952). 
61 S Breyer (n 11), 6, 199; TK McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (London, 1984).
62 R Coase (n 54).
63 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th edn, Boston, 1998); S Shavell, A Model of the Optimal 
Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 15 Rand J. Econ. 271-80 (1984).
64 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 58), 401.
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Litigation (contract and tort disputes) and regulation are two alternative institu-
tional arrangements to secure property and rights in general. The assumption is that 
whatever law enforcement strategy a society chooses, private individuals will seek 
to subvert any institutional arrangement, common law or otherwise in place to secure 
property or rights in general to benefit themselves, and more aptly to benefit them-
selves unfairly.65 Therefore, the law becomes inefficient. The necessity of regulation 
arose because of the subversion of justice; this theory is vividly displayed in the rise 
of the regulatory state in modern times. Subversion of justice, during the late eigh-
teenth-century industrialisation of society, exposed the inefficiency of common law. 
Regulation emerged to solve the societal problems that consequently caused market 
failures.
Subversion here means a number of both legal and illegal strategies.66 Legal sub-
version, for example, includes delaying tactics in a court case (contract or tort) or 
making justice exorbitantly expensive for a weaker party through better lawyers, lob-
bying for the appointment of favourable judges, and influencing the legislative process 
to acquire favourable legislation and regulations and so on. Illegal subversion includes 
intimidating and bribing law enforcers, judges, regulators, police, and juries and so 
on. By utilising enough resources, law violators can get away with simply having to 
pay regulatory fines and liability payments.
However, the efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements in part depends 
on their vulnerability to such subversions of justice.67 Vulnerability means suscepti-
bility or weakness the of law vis-à-vis individual self-interest. A private individual’s 
subversive self-interest in these contexts is always a threat to the workings of the law. 
The problem with the free market model is that it assumes that there is such a thing 
as a perfect market, which is impossible to achieve.68 It does not take into account 
myriad factors such as dishonesty, embezzlement, greed or human error, which are 
highlighted by Keynes.69 The reason that private law could not successfully address 
the problem is due to the inherent vulnerability of law to the subversive ability of 
individuals’ selfish and unfair interests. Without the utopian concept of the ‘perfect 
market’, the law is unable to protect property rights and rights in general in absolute 
terms.
The industrialisation of society in the nineteenth century created the circumstances 
in which the common law system of justice became vulnerable to subversion. Litiga-
tion (liability-damages) was no longer an efficient mechanism to solve societal prob-
lems. As the industrialisation of the economy in the later part of the nineteenth century 
took hold, it created companies with vast resources. Along with the size of the enter-




68 I Katsuhito, The Second End of Laissez-faire: The Bootstrapping Nature of Money and the Inher-
ent Instability of Capitalism in H Ganssman, New Approaches to Monetary Theory: Interdisciplinary 
Perspective, 237 (Abingdon, 2011). 
69 M Keynes (n 47).
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in relative terms did not rise much for the big enterprises. Therefore the incentive to 
avoid paying for liabilities also increased; in this scenario, the law became more vul-
nerable to subversion. Smaller businesses or individuals working in these enterprises 
had little chance of prevailing against them in the case of an accident, restraint of 
trade or discriminatory practice. From this perspective, the regulation of the markets 
was an appropriate response to the ineffectiveness of litigation as a mechanism of 
social control of business.70 It highlighted the inefficiency of the common law. This 
structural change in the market place increased the vulnerability of the private law 
and made it more efficient for American society to rely increasingly on regulation 
than on litigation.71 Woodrow Wilson highlighted the phenomenon of subversion of 
justice when he said, “the laws of this country do not prevent the strong from crush-
ing the weak”.72 The subversion of justice73 and the inefficiency of the common law 
mechanism of litigation created market failures of various sorts, which paved the way 
to a fundamental change to make it efficient by relying on regulation.
Society must choose between private enforcement (litigation) and/or regulation to 
seek justice. Too much, frequent and protracted litigation might seem an efficient 
enforcement of liabilities, but in reality the efficiency becomes victim of this exces-
sive activity (subversion of justice). In such circumstances, less litigation and more 
regulation will achieve better outcomes in terms of efficiency. For example, the fixed 
cost of lawsuits is a potential argument in favour of enforcement through regulation 
as opposed to private law.74 This argument highlights the inherent drawback of liti-
gation.75 From the efficiency perspective, in certain circumstances regulation emerges 
as a better choice to deal with tort and contract problems. The overwhelming ‘trans-
action costs’ become the determining factor for a choice between common law and 
regulation76 however, this does not mean that the regulation itself is devoid of prob-
lems, it can also fall victim of inefficiency77. Thus, it may be determined that legal or 
illegal subversions, whether through transaction costs or otherwise, would cause 
unfair situations and consequently the emergence of regulation.
70 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 58), 402.
71 Ibid.
72 W Wilson, The New Freedom, 15 (New York, 1913).
73 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 58), 402. According to Glaeser and Shleifer, an invulnerable justice 
system, where law and order are strong would not require any regulation. Where law and order are 
intermediate, the justice system will be vulnerable to some extent and there will be a need for some 
regulation and the enforcement of common law. However, where the justice system is most vulnerable, 
meaning where there is a very little law and order, there is a need of more for regulation. 
74 Posner (n 63).
75 Shavell (63).
76 R Coase (n 54), 1-44; R Posner (n 63); S Shavell (n 63), 271-80. See also Shavell Steven,  Liability 
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety 13 J. Legal Studies.354-74 (1994); also S Shavell (n 63) 
77 See G Stigler( n 19); R Posner (n 63). This view is advocated by the ‘capture’ and ‘special 
 interest’ theories of regulation. According to these theories, regulation is sought by interest groups in 
order to restrain competition, particularly from groups that hold an upper hand in the field of technology. 
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E. Inherent Inefficiency and Inadequacy of Common Law
A legal framework where markets operate without regulation has two important 
aspects to be considered.78 The first is the structure and operation of the market itself; 
second are the transactions taking place in the market.79 These are two distinctive 
things. From a structural and operational point of view, an unregulated market will 
allow free access to the market place to all kinds of buyers and sellers, meaning that 
there is no licensing or authorisation requirements for the market participants for a 
particular market activity. Unrestricted access to a market may cause market failure 
if unscrupulous and unqualified individuals are allowed to practice.80 For example, a 
banking institution should only be allowed a licence to practise if it fulfils certain 
criteria, which will generate confidence and trust in the market. This trust is important 
as individual customers have no way of finding out whether an institution is credible 
or not, and they must be confident that their rights are well protected – a phenomenon 
seen in the cases of PP protection in UK.
The second aspect of the legal framework is the administration of transactions in 
the market. Property, contract and tort law are necessary components of this legal 
framework; together they define ownership interests and their mode of transfer.81 In 
many cases, a market can work successfully on the basis of general principles of com-
mercial law and tort without the assistance of any regulatory regime, simply because 
the law is sufficiently developed in that particular area to take care of certainty of 
ownership interests and their transfer, and to check for fraud and the protection of 
private rights. However, an unregulated market can also present potential problems; 
this is where regulation becomes a necessity.82
The obvious scenario is where there is no control on the terms that may be agreed 
between contracting parties; the party with a weaker bargaining position may not have 
much choice but to accept a bad bargain. Such a situation has long been viewed as 
unfair; however, more importantly in the present discussion this has been interpreted 
as an inefficient market because it is more likely to inhibit contracting between the 
parties and consequently the process of investment. Regulatory rules are mandatory 
in nature; they must be observed and cannot be excluded by agreement between par-
ties. These rules differ fundamentally from the rules of contract law (common law) 
which are default rules, meaning that they can be altered by express agreement 
between the contracting parties, whereas regulatory rules cannot be circumvented.83 
The noticeable example of regulatory rules is The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.84 
78 IG MacNeil, An Introduction To The Law on Financial Investment, 28 (2nd edn,Oxford, 2012).
79 Ibid. 
80 R Baldwin and M Cave (n 4), 16.
81 IG MacNeil (n 78), 28.
82 See generally Ogus (n 10), chs 3 and 10.
83 IG MacNeil (n 78), 28.
84 Older examples are common law restraints over freedom of contract. See also s 232, the Com-
panies Act: it makes void any contract that exempts or restricts the liability of a director to a company 
for breach of duty.
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Thus the term ‘regulation’ in its technical meaning simply means that regulatory rules 
are mandatory, which prohibit or limit the operation of general rules of contract law 
or private law for that matter. Also, in common parlance, the term ‘regulation’ refers 
to rules and procedures created by statue. Thus, private law has embraced regulatory 
rules along with the general law. Thus, emergence of regulation is caused by two 
factors, namely inefficiency of common law and the subversion of common law.
The rationale for regulation is that general commercial law (private law) and, in 
particular, contract law and property law fail to offer an adequate basis for the proper 
functioning of the markets due to the legal or illegal subversion of the civil law.85 Thus 
regulations are differentiated from the general law (e.g. common law or civil law) 
and are introduced when general law fails to resolve a problem fairly and when only 
government intervention (public regulation) will resolve the problem and correct the 
unfair situation to control and guide the economy and society. It includes all kinds of 
legislation (regulation), be it primary, secondary or tertiary. Regulation comprises 
not only rulemaking but also rule monitoring and enforcement.86
Furthermore, regulation emerges not only as a result of the subversion of justice 
(subversion of contract or tort law) but also because of inadequacies in private law 
(common, tort and contract law). Regulation emerges as a mechanism to deal with 
circumstances in which common law and private law are found inadequate, in other 
words deficient, to restore injustice.
F. Rights and Justice, and Inadequacy of Private Law
The emergence of regulation is inconceivable without the analysis of fundamental 
concepts of rights and justice. Rights are a central concern of jurisprudence and jus-
tice is a universally praised virtue of a legal system that transcends law itself.87 
Beyond the subversion of existing rights, individuals are asserting new rights, expos-
ing the inadequacy of the present private law regime. The idea of rights stands on the 
claim that we as human beings are entitled to certain fundamental and inalienable 
rights merely by virtue of being human; whether these rights are legally recognised 
is immaterial. The question, what is a right, can be answered in two ways. There are 
rights that are recognised by law and there are rights that one ought to have. A right 
is defined as the protection of a legitimate interest. An ‘interest theory’ of rights 
obliges us that if there is an interest, not protected by law, then a law should protect 
it.88 Such protection of interests has nothing to do with market failure; rather it is a 
fundamental normative principle that certain interests in certain circumstances need 
to be protected through the emergence of new regulation. This protection of interests 
85 IG MacNeil (78), 19-21 & 27-31.
86 C Hood, H Rothstein and R Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation 
Regimes (2001). 
87 R Wacks, Philosophy of Law, 65 (Oxford, 2014).
88 Ibid. at 66.
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through regulation is warranted in the wake of subversion of justice (failure of private 
law to protect rights) as well as by creating new rights on the basis of justice and fair-
ness; for example, social rights, such as some environmental and human rights,89 may 
not currently be legally protected in a particular jurisdiction.
In mankind’s relatively recent history, the protection of legitimate interests of 
humans through law and public regulations can be discerned in three stages.90 The 
first stage is in the form of negative civil and political rights, which bear the mark of 
Hobbs, Lock and Mills; their emphasis is on the prohibition of interference with right-
holders freedom. The second stage consists of positive rights, such as the right to 
education and medical care. The third stage emphasises collective rights. These ‘social 
solidarity’ rights run alongside legitimate human concerns.91 They concern human 
social and economic development involving benefits from earth and space resources, 
windfall profits that did not happen because of a planned business effort but as a 
natural phenomenon, the right to healthy environment, and so on. Regulation emerges 
in such areas as these where private law could be found inadequate and deficient and 
where only regulation would resolve injustice.
This leads us to Aristotle’s assertion that justice consists in treating equals equally 
and unequals unequally, in proportion to their inequality. In this vein, the develop-
ment of ‘social solidarity’ rights rests upon ‘distributive’ justice,92 which allows each 
individual what is due to them according to what they deserve. Distributive justice is 
the concern of public regulation – how society should most fairly distribute the ben-
efits of social life is a true reflection of utilitarianism. On the other hand, whether law 
and economics or economic factors play a significant role in decisions of the courts 
is not without controversy. The idea behind economic analysis of law (Coase’s theo-
rem) is the maximisation of wealth – the same as utilitarianism. Maximisation of 
wealth in itself as a ‘value’ is unlikely to be traded against justice; this would be an 
oversimplification of ‘individual choice’ – an ideological tilt towards excessive 
capitalism and the free-market with little to do with justice or distributive justice.93 
Although Coase presupposes original distribution of wealth, it may not necessarily 
be ‘distributive justice’. In such circumstances, regulation could be justified. The late 
nineteenth-century industrialisation of society proved that increased wealth and power 
often lead to subversion of private law. The outcomes of litigation during this period 
were profoundly different than those envisaged by Coase in his theorem. His transac-
tions costs theory does not figure in the reality of subversion of law; rather it is 
focussed on the allusive concept of the ‘perfect market’.
John Rawls’ theory of justice – the concept of justice as fairness – is the most rel-
evant idea in relation to the rationale for the emergence of regulation. Utilitarianism 
per se does not provide a benchmark for justice. For Rawls, maximum welfare (util-
89 T Prosser, Regulation and Social Solidarity 33 Journal of Law and Solidarity 364 (2006). 
90 R Wacks (n 87), 70-71.
91 T Prosser (n 89), 364.
92 Aristotle distinguishes between ‘corrective’ and ‘distributive’ justice.
93 R Wacks (n 87), 70-71.
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itarianism) is unacceptable if it causes inequality; for him, the subject of justice takes 
priority over happiness, meaning that a particular happiness also has to be just in the 
first place; therefore he calls justice fairness. Rawls’ theory is deeply rooted in the 
idea of the social contract theorised by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, as an abstrac-
tion of a higher level, embedded in principles of justice.
It transpires that regulation does not deal with market failures.94 Rather, it deals 
with the subversion or absence of justice.95 It is underpinned by social justice and 
fairness, which may be explained by social theory. Regulation is primarily a social 
phenomenon.96 It inspires us to think ‘what kind of society do we want to be’ and 
‘what is good for us all’.97 The rationales for regulation are embedded in constitutional 
norms.98 Regulation as a public intervention is to deliver social purpose and social 
justice. This idea of regulation may be found in the civil law system in the form of 
‘implementing values of public service and as providing a contribution to social 
solidarity’.99 It can be argued that in the face of subversion of justice or unjust cir-
cumstances or unfairness, the emergence of regulation is a political response to main-
tain ideas of justice and fairness.100 Indeed, Adam Smith saw “a tolerable 
administration of justice” as a proper function of government for the sake of fairness.
G. Regulatory Intervention: Political Perspective
In the context about the necessity of regulation, we once again ask what ‘regulation’ 
means. Based on the above analysis of the term ‘regulation’, intuitive understanding 
of the term is that it is a government intervention in the private domain to shape the 
94 See A Pigou (n 29); J Stiglitz (n 9).
95 EL Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer (n 58), 40-42.
96 Cf. A Ogus (n 10) 4, 46-56. While Ogus accepts ‘market failure’ analyses, he also accepts distribu-
tional justice and community values. See also, Baldwin and Cave (n 4), 22-23. They accept distributional 
justice and social policy as rationales for regulation; S Breyer (n 11), 15-35: Along with ‘market failure’, 
they accept fairness and distributional justice as rationales for regulation; J Black, A Critical Reflections 
on Regulation, LSE Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Paper 4 (2002) at 7. 
97 J Black, Proceduralising Regulation – Part I 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597-614 (2000), 
and Part II 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33-58, 59 (2001). See also C Sunstein (n 21), 229. In 
respect of reliance on neoclassical economics, Sunstein states that it “cannot capture the diverse legiti-
mate reasons for regulatory controls”.
98 C Sunstein (n 21), 231.
99 T Prosser (n 89), 364, 378. See generally C Graham and T Prosser, Privatizing Public Enterprises 
– Constitutions, the State and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 1991); L Duguit, The 
Law and the State 31 Harvard Law Review 183-4 (1917); See also T Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise: 
Government Regulation and Legitimacy, 11-12 (Oxford, 2012), where Prosser indicates four rationales 
for regulation: (1) regulation for economic efficiency and consumer choice – this is market-centred regu-
lation; (2) regulation to protect rights; (3) regulation for social solidarity; and (4) regulation as delibera-
tion (meaning, the provision of process to resolve problems). See also J Black, Critical Reflections on 
Regulation (n 96); H.McVea, Financial Services Regulation Under the Financial Services Authority: A 
Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis? 64 Cambridge Law Journal 413-48 (2005).
100 See generally, J Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven:Yale U.Press. 1938).
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behaviour of legal or natural persons. Ideologically and politically, regulation is often 
contested and is viewed from different perspectives. Thinkers on the right see regula-
tory intervention as a restriction on their liberties; the classical left views it as serving 
the interest of the bourgeois class; and for a progressive democrats, it is an efficient 
tool to iron out inequalities in a society and address other myriad social risks, e.g. 
environment, health and financial sector and so on.
However, traditionally the controversy about intervention is narrowly pitched 
between two schools of thought regarding whether regulation is necessary at all. The 
prominent economic theories are Adam Smith’s laissez-faire and John Maynard 
Keynes’ Keynesianism. Both of these theories deal with market failure in their own 
distinctive way. Both argue to promote stability, but it is impossible for either to 
achieve that because market failures – small or large – are inherent to markets.
Smith as such did not use the term laissez-faire; however the premise of his theory 
is that free trade between nations is beneficial for development.101 Notably, Smith 
expressed his idea as ‘free trade’, removing barriers to trade rather than a ‘free 
market’.102 His idea was in response to mercantilist theory.103 However, his idea has 
been applied to the ‘free market’ ever since.104 Some would argue that Smith never 
intended his theory to be applied to economic theory, and doing has corrupted his 
idea.105 Smith’s theory is that markets will correct themselves with the intervention 
of the invisible hand.106 He believed that the free market is an efficient market and 
that regulation will corrupt it.107 However, it is strongly believed that his theory of 
laissez-faire proved to be inadequate in the Great Depression of the 1930s.108
The opponents of intervention – the laissez-faire school – believe that “the prov-
ince of government should be restricted… to the protection of person and property 
against force or fraud”.109 Broadly it means that the laws of the land in a particular 
legal tradition (e.g. common law or civil law and so on) are sufficient, and that there 
is no necessity for them to be supplemented by further regulation, i.e. government 
intervention in a private domain of the citizens or society. Smith makes the strongest 
101 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; The Wealth of 
Nations (London, 1904); O Mutanga, The 21st Century and its Challenges: Reconsidering the Keynesian 
State 7(1) World Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development 39 (2011).
102 D Ben-David, MB Loewy, Free-Trade, Growth, and Convergence 3 Journal of Economic Growth 
143 (1998).
103 H Miller, DB Yoffie, Between Free-trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a The-
ory of Corporate Trade Demands 43(2) International Organisation 239 (1989).
104 MA Zupan, The Virtues of Free Market 31(2) Cato Journal 171 (2011).
105 WJ Samuels, SG Medema, Freeing Smith from the “Free Market”; On the Misperception of 
Adam Smith on the Economic Role of Government 37 (2) History of Political Economy 219 (2005).
106 A Smith (n 101); See also, P Oslington, God and the Market: Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand 108 
Journal of Business Ethics 429, 430 (2012); PT Lesson, CJ Coyne, PJ Boettke, Does the Market Self-
correct? Asymmetrical Adjustment and the Structure of Economic Error 18 (1) Review of Political 
Economy 79 (2006); A Harel, G Harpaz and JC Francis, Analysis of Efficient Markets 36 (2) Review 
of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 287, 295 (2011). 
107 J Viner, Adam Smith and Laissez-faire 35 (2) Journal of Political Economy 198,199 (1927).
108 MN Rothbard, America’s Great Depression (Alabama, 2000).
109 JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 525 (1848).
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defence of this argument in the context of economics. He is an ardent opponent of 
government intervention (i.e. regulation) in the market; rather he advocates a free 
market that will correct itself.
On the other hand, the advocates of intervention believe that the government should 
intervene “wherever its intervention would be useful”.110 To make his case, John 
Stuart Mill opined in his discussion of “sale of poisons” that it was “a proper office 
of public authority to guard against accidents”.111 He argued that, “[i]f poisons were 
never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder, it would be 
right to prohibit their manufacture and sale”.112 He acknowledged that products might 
be complex, as in the case of poison. He argued that poisons may “be wanted not only 
for innocent but for useful purposes and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one 
case without operating in the other”.113 Therefore, in Mills view, precautionary mea-
sures such as labelling “the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous char-
acter, may be enforced without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not to know 
that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities”.114 A number of poisons such as 
tobacco products are still legal and their regulation remains contested. Similarly com-
plex financial products like credit cards and investment instruments have a useful 
purpose but can be toxic if used recklessly. This regulatory approach has long been 
the tradition of the regulatory regimes in the UK and the US.
John Keynes put forward a robust argument in favour of regulatory intervention. 
His thesis is that markets do fail and in such circumstances regulatory intervention is 
inevitable to correct them.115 The history of regulation tells us that this debate about 
regulatory intervention has been won in favour of intervention. Most of the discourse 
is about the type and scope of the regulation. The failure of laissez-faire during the 
Great Depression in the 1930s revived Mill’s idea of state intervention in the form of 
Keynesianism.116 At the end of the Second World War, two ideas – Marxism and 
Keynesianism – emerged as alternatives to the laissez-faire.117 They emerged because 
capitalism and laissez-faire were both failing.118 America followed Keynesianism and 
witnessed a long period of stability.119
110 Ibid.




115 JM Keynes (n 47).
116 G Atkinson, T Oleson Jr, Commons and Keynes: Their Assault on Laissez-faire 32 (4) Journal 
of Economic Issues 1019, 1022 (1998). 
117 P Kenway, Marx, Keynes and the Possibility of Crisis 4 Cambridge Journal of Economics 23 
(1980).
118 D Dillard, Keynes and Marx: A Central Appraisal 6(3) Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, 
421 (1984); See also, J Crotty, The Realism of Assumptions Does Matter: Why Keynes-Minsky Theory 
Must Replace Efficient Market Theory as the Guide to Financial Regulation Policy in MH Wolfson and 
GA Epstein, The Handbook of the Political Economy of Financial Crisis (Oxford, 2012). 
119 D Felix, Keynesian Consequences 41 (6) Society 58, 62 (2004).
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Keynesianism expressed a view that laissez-faire on its own is unable to create a 
high level of employment and consequent economic stability120 and that the depres-
sions were avoidable121 with expansive policy.122 Keynesianism expressed that state 
regulatory intervention would materialise in high investment and consumption and 
hence high employment. Recently, during the 2008 financial crisis, a financial system 
and its banks that were viewed as ‘too big to fail’ were saved by Keynesian interven-
tion across the world.123
H. Conclusion: Market Failure, a Symptom of Subversion of Justice
Market failure is a symptom of the failure of common law, not in itself a cause for 
the emergence of regulation, as thought by economists. The concept of market failure, 
as generally understood, cannot be put forward as a rationale for regulation; rather it 
is used to set a threshold of subversion of justice beyond which adoption of regulation 
becomes necessary. It indicates how significant subversion of justice is in given cir-
cumstances. The concept of market failure is merely a cost-benefit analysis tool, used 
in the understanding of ‘risk’ and the cost of a particular risk. It allows us to measure 
whether a particular risk is bearable or whether the cost of regulation outweighs the 
benefits. Economic reasoning in the process of the development of regulations takes 
place once significant subversion of justice has been identified – a point where regu-
lation in terms of economic benefit is legitimate.
Regulation is a legal concept and has an incidental relationship with market fail-
ures. It is about property rights and rights in general; inherently, the discussion of 
rights is a matter for law and politics, not economics. Property as an economic unit 
is primarily a legal concept. Furthermore, where necessary (in inefficient situation) 
regulation also criminalises actions and inactions of persons in orders to improve 
efficiency and achieve social justice.
120 T Naggar, Adam Smith’s Laissez-faire 21 (2) The American Economist 35, 38 (1977).
121 D Fand, Monetary Theories, Stabilization Policy, and Recent Inflation 1(3) Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 556, 557 (1969).
122 D Felix (n 119), 58, 61.
123 S Suarez, R Kolodny, Paving the Road to “ Too Big to Fail”: Business Interests and the Politics 
of Financial Deregulation in the United States 39 Politics and Society 74 (2011); M Kitson, R Martin, 
P Tyler, The Geographies of Austerity 4 Cambridge Journal of Region, Economy and Society 289, 299 
(2011).
